FightingArts Estore
Pressure Points
From a medical professional, straight facts on where and how to hit that can save your life.
Stretching
Limber or not, anyone can add height and speed to their kicks with this method.
Calligraphy
For yourself or as a gift, calligraphy is special, unique and lasting.
Karate Uniforms
Look your best. Max snap. low cost & superior crafted: “Peak Performance Gold” 16 oz uniforms.

MOTOBU
Classic book translation. Hard to find. Not in stores.
Who's Online
0 registered (), 44 Guests and 1 Spider online.
Key: Admin, Global Mod, Mod
Newest Members
Shanktotheright, royal, bobgalle100011, agenonline, TooNice
22862 Registered Users
Top Posters (30 Days)
Dobbersky 3
THEFOREVERMAN 3
MattJ 2
royal 2
Marcus Charles 1
April
Su M Tu W Th F Sa
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10 11 12
13 14 15 16 17 18 19
20 21 22 23 24 25 26
27 28 29 30
New Topics
Judo Olympic Games 1964 Tokyo, The Video Gallery
by ergees
04/01/14 05:26 AM
Muay Thai Seminar with Greg Nelson - Marcus Charle
by Marcus Charles
03/24/14 04:39 PM
Fighting On Saturday!!!
by Dobbersky
03/20/14 05:45 AM
Where Are They Now?
by Dobbersky
05/30/13 08:08 AM
AKK kata question
by
09/04/05 01:27 PM
Recent Posts
Fighting On Saturday!!!
by THEFOREVERMAN
Yesterday at 08:22 AM
Muay Thai Seminar with Greg Nelson - Marcus Charle
by THEFOREVERMAN
Yesterday at 08:20 AM
AKK kata question
by MattJ
04/04/14 05:45 PM
Judo Olympic Games 1964 Tokyo, The Video Gallery
by ergees
04/01/14 05:26 AM
Forum Stats
22862 Members
36 Forums
35546 Topics
432378 Posts

Max Online: 424 @ 09/24/13 10:38 PM
Page 4 of 7 < 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 >
Topic Options
#294742 - 10/27/06 07:01 PM Re: 33 Strategies of War [Re: TimBlack]
Ed_Morris Offline
Professional Poster

Registered: 11/04/05
Posts: 6768
I guess it could be taken literally...or it could be a frame of mind.

Top
#294743 - 10/27/06 07:20 PM Re: 33 Strategies of War [Re: Ed_Morris]
TimBlack Offline
Exalted

Registered: 05/10/05
Posts: 1403
Loc: UK, Brighton
Quote:

for a good example in history, look to Cortez in the Spanish conquest of Mexico against the 1 million strong Aztec empire. After onshore a while, his men were growing uneasy and were talking of mutany to return home to their families in Spain via escape to Cuba. Cortez order the ships to be scuttled so his men had no choice but to push on with him as their only way home.





I can't give these issues the depth they require, for obvious reasons. I'll try to simly make broad assertions and add a couple of reasons, but if you're interested, I invite you to do some extra reading as they do make fascinating subjects.

In reality, Cortez wasn't putting himself in a 'desperate' situation. The Spaniards had an enormous advantage in that Western warfare is based upon attrition - killing the enemy - while the central Americans had a highly ritualised form of warfare based around the prestige of capturing prisoners. The Spanish cutlass is designed to kill quickly and easily, while the azteks were using blunt stone or crude metal weapons designed to bludgen an enemy to incapacitation. This is only one facet of the reason Cortez was at an advantage, however.

The Spaniards also did not arrive to conquer. Whatever happened later, land was in fact an accident of an original attempt simply to set up a highly lucrative Spanish trading-system. I like to compare it to the Opium Wars in China, or the move from economic to military hegemony on the Indian subcontinent in the 19th century.

Quote:


The Russians during WWII, particularly in defense of their homeland against German invasion, had strict policies and enforcement of deserters on a battlefield. Deployed in the rear of fighting units would be machine gunners who's only mission it was to enforce this policy, and only as a last resort, they would engage the actual enemy.





This happened predominately early war. We're talking 41-late 42, during which the Red Army was in dire straits. Once the cream of the German Army had been broken at Stalingrad, the Russians suffered much lower casualties and a much smaller problem of desertion.

The simple fact is that the problem with desertion was one which was rather irrelevent in the early war. The German Army used large flanking movements which created pockets of Russian units. These divisions, lacking supplies, faced the choice of whether to stay there and starve, try and break out against an enemy on the defensive and with an artillery and armour monopoly, or try to 'slip out'. The fact is that once these pockets were created, whatever they did they would end up as prisoners and die (often both given the slave labour employed in Germany). This is where most of the casualties on the Russian side come from.

Post-war novels, films and some military histories would have you believe that the Red Army behaved by throwing its troops in headlong charges at machine guns with appalling losses, keeping the troops in line with fear, and basically steamrollering the Germans back by pure weight of numbers. The reality couldn't be more different, and what these claims really came down to was an attempt to remind the West of the Red Threat - a horde of soldiers who cared nothing for their own lives. In addition, the myth that the German Army had been overpowered by sheer weight of numbers vindicated German generals and fanboys who wanted to believe the mythology of a technologically and tactically superior Whermacht. Towards the last couple of years of the war, casualty statistics almost reached parity, and reflected pretty evenly losses on the Western front. The German losses stacked up, precisely because the Russians were then able to create pockets of their own.

I've gone off the point, but anyway the point is that the Red Army did not rely on shooting thousands of deserters much more than the Germans or Western Allies. When they did use it, early war, it was utterly pointless anyway and simply added to the casualties level. It certainly didn't put the ordinary soldier into 'desperation' mode, any more than the average soldier is in during war - which, by the way, tends to engender the '[censored] my pants and hide in a hole' mentality pretty well by itself.

Quote:

I think the lesson here is we become more commited to the fight when our options are limited. limiting one's options on purpose to aquire this state of mind is sometimes strategically wise for the greater cause.





The best options are always limited. The only reason you want to lower options is when dealing with those who cannot see the bigger picture. If slowing up an enemy in a particular area is absolutely imperative, you may have to take away flight options (and it probably won't work; at some point the soldiers just crack and then it's either run or surrender). In any case, the individual soldier in any army has few options - they simply have to obey orders, ala Charge of the Light Brigade. So my point is that you never limit your own options, just those of your subordinates, and your enemies. But your options are always inherently limited to the best option you can see anyway, so the idea of intentionally putting yourself in a situation of limited options is absurd. Take the best option, and make sure you have a plan B, C, D and Z.
_________________________
My Workout Log

Top
#294744 - 10/27/06 11:49 PM Re: 33 Strategies of War [Re: TimBlack]
Ed_Morris Offline
Professional Poster

Registered: 11/04/05
Posts: 6768
good points!
The 'limiting options' idea assumes that we ourselves are imperfect and we can't assume plan A and Plan B,C,D are the best....but we can't afford to second-guess either.
not fighting and not going to war is always an option....sometimes an emotional one based on fear. since these tactics deal only with War itself, and not sucessful peace - some of the strategies will seem counter-intuitive.

read on...

Top
#294745 - 10/27/06 11:55 PM Re: 33 Strategies of War [Re: Ed_Morris]
Ed_Morris Offline
Professional Poster

Registered: 11/04/05
Posts: 6768
9. TURN THE TABLES: THE COUNTERATTACK STRATEGY

Moving first - initiating attack - will often put you at a disadvantage: You are exposing your strategy and limiting your options. Instead, discover the power holding back and letting the other side move first, giving you the flexability to counterattack from any angle. If your opponents are aggressive, bait them into a rash attack that will leave them in a weak position.

Top
#294746 - 10/28/06 06:18 AM Re: 33 Strategies of War [Re: Ed_Morris]
TimBlack Offline
Exalted

Registered: 05/10/05
Posts: 1403
Loc: UK, Brighton
Quote:

9. TURN THE TABLES: THE COUNTERATTACK STRATEGY

Moving first - initiating attack - will often put you at a disadvantage: You are exposing your strategy and limiting your options. Instead, discover the power holding back and letting the other side move first, giving you the flexability to counterattack from any angle. If your opponents are aggressive, bait them into a rash attack that will leave them in a weak position.




I think this strategy misses the point really. The idea is not to decide "I will counter-attack", the idea is to hold the initiative. That means that you dictate what the enemy does. The basics: almost inevitably, you cannot have a firepower/numerical advantage all across the front (by the way just substitute firepower for whatever era you like). So, you need to focus what you have in certain places, and use them against areas which have a much lower concentration.

When you decide to rely on the counter-attack, you allow your enemy to focus as much as he likes, while you have to keep defending all areas. The only case in which this kind of strategy works is when you can use a mobile reserve (say a few divisions of mechanised infantry and armour), wait for an area to be attacked, and hope that you have the forces to hold the enemy off. I guess a good example of this would be World War 1, in which there was a move by the Germans towards 'elastic defense', where the front line was held by very small forces (basically just a few machine guns), which would still take a big toll in life, and then a second line which would go to areas of the front line under attack and defend it. To be honest, I'm not sure this example is a good reason to adopt counter-attack as a useful strategy, since it relied upon a time in warfare when defensive warfare was hugely more effective than offensive.

So, I'd say that counter-attacks have a part to play, but they should never be considered a strategy in themselves - they're simply a tool you can use in order to hold onto the initiative, which is what you really need in order to close down the enemy's options and allow you to select who, and where, you engage, with which of your forces (warfare often comes down to rock-paper-scissors).
_________________________
My Workout Log

Top
#294747 - 10/28/06 08:02 AM Re: 33 Strategies of War [Re: TimBlack]
Ed_Morris Offline
Professional Poster

Registered: 11/04/05
Posts: 6768
When I first read thru these, one by one, I found myself also disagreeing with some...but then I noticed some contradict each other, and wondered if I was reading them the wrong way.

just as in 'Art of War', I don't think they are meant to be as a step-by-step playbook. instead they need to be considered in their combined wisdom...not as an exclusive set.

what helps to see it this way, is by adding the word "sometimes..." before each strategy.

or think in terms of chess. surely sometimes it's sound strategy to wait for attack...particularly when you sense desparation on your opponents part.

all things equal, opening first in chess is considered a disadvantage.

Top
#294748 - 10/29/06 12:28 PM Re: 33 Strategies of War [Re: Ed_Morris]
TimBlack Offline
Exalted

Registered: 05/10/05
Posts: 1403
Loc: UK, Brighton
Yeah, I guess so, but part of my problem with it is that it focuses on the counter-attack as a strategy, rather than focusing on keeping the initiative. It assumes that your enemy isn't going to expect you to counter-attack (which is always the assumption) and also that you have the means to deliver your force concentration to the correct point at the correct time.
_________________________
My Workout Log

Top
#294749 - 10/29/06 07:58 PM Re: 33 Strategies of War [Re: Ed_Morris]
UofM Shorin Ryu Offline
Resident Forum Breakdancer

Registered: 02/07/05
Posts: 981
Quote:

9. TURN THE TABLES: THE COUNTERATTACK STRATEGY

Moving first - initiating attack - will often put you at a disadvantage: You are exposing your strategy and limiting your options. Instead, discover the power holding back and letting the other side move first, giving you the flexability to counterattack from any angle. If your opponents are aggressive, bait them into a rash attack that will leave them in a weak position.





Quote:


Yeah, I guess so, but part of my problem with it is that it focuses on the counter-attack as a strategy, rather than focusing on keeping the initiative. It assumes that your enemy isn't going to expect you to counter-attack (which is always the assumption) and also that you have the means to deliver your force concentration to the correct point at the correct time.





Well, my view of this isn't so much that the counter-attack be unknown by the enemy, but rather that it be unexpected.

The best example of this strategy can be seen with Alexander the Great, or in several Roman sources.

The "initiative" aspect of this is the idea of pre-emtive attack. Alex, as well as several Roman generals, would charge with inferior numbers in order to disrupt the enemy and keep them unorganized. Alex is often seen at the head of the hetairoi making some foolhearty charge into the massive Persian ranks. But there's a thin line between genius and madman. Alex knew that if the Persian army was given time to properly form up and prep battle lines, he was in trouble. Therefore, you see several of Alex's battles beginning with a cavalry charge into unorganized Persians....

The "strategy" side is best seen with Hannibal, at Cannae. His battle strategy there epitomizes the Counter-Attack strategy.



As you can see here, Hannibal starts the battle in a very specific organized structure (also encompasing some earlier Strategies...). Hannibal counter-attacks in the middle slide, with his cavalry and reserve infantry (the elite, veterans, and heavy inf) sweeping the sides and enveloping the Roman army. And the result is clear, with it being one of the bloodiest days and worst losses in Roman history.

That's why this is focused on Strategy. The idea is actually NOT always assumed that the counter-attack will be some invisible reserves hiding in the woods, rather that the attack will not be predicted.

All of Hannibal's men were visible at the outset, and if the Roman commander had half a brain, he would have recognized the danger of Hannibal's formation at the outset of the battle. Thus, the assumption that the counter-attack is unexpected is indeed true, but it isn't necessarily invisible to enemy forces.

The strategy works not because you happen to "time things right", as suggested above (Mr. Black), but rather because the situation was molded in a way prior to the battle to allow the possibility of a counter-attack. This is why the Strategy says the following:

Quote:


Instead, discover the power holding back and letting the other side move first, giving you the flexability to counterattack from any angle.





Hannibal's formation allowed his army to do whatever it wanted. The Romans had one strategy, and one result. Once they were trapped, they could only push forward.

Even if Hannibal's middle had collapsed and routed, he still had two large contingents on the sides to fight with (both of which were his stronger forces anyways). Hence, by maintaining a defensive stance, he maintains flexibility THROUGHOUT the battle.

The Romans have momentum and initiative at the beginning, but Hannibal is able to sacrafice this early initiative in order to gain it once the forces were engaged.

Quote:


If your opponents are aggressive, bait them into a rash attack that will leave them in a weak position.





I think this is the most important line of the strategy, and the reason it is a "Strategy" rather than an important point about "initiative". Initiative becomes obsolete once the battle has commenced, and the battle conditions change constantly. The victor is decidd by which army and general maintains the highest ability to ADAPT to the changing conditions. Hannibal is able to adapt to the fact that the Roman charge in standard formation was virtually unstopable, but the Romans were unable to adapt to the fact that they had gotten themselves surrounded by breaking formation and continuing on the early momentum and initiative at the start of the battle.
_________________________
Alea iacta est ~ Gauis Julius Caesar Ne quis nimis ~ Solon Nuts to cancer ~ Sanchin31

Top
#294750 - 10/31/06 03:11 PM Re: 33 Strategies of War [Re: UofM Shorin Ryu]
TimBlack Offline
Exalted

Registered: 05/10/05
Posts: 1403
Loc: UK, Brighton
Is the battle of Canae an example of a counter-attack? It's just, to me it seems more like an example of why an attacker should never develop unsupported salients and should, instead, always seek to turn an enemy's flank or side so that they don't have to fight on two fronts... After all, Canae is an example of flank attack more than anything - I agree that the Romans attacked, but surely to claim that Hannibal's strategy was a 'counter-attack' rather than a novel method for taking pockets (ie. encirclement strategy) is a stretching the idea of counter-attack a little? Or would you consider a flank attack to be a counter-attack? I guess it depends on definition to a degree...

(and, by the way, nice graphics )
_________________________
My Workout Log

Top
#294751 - 11/01/06 02:53 AM Re: 33 Strategies of War [Re: TimBlack]
UofM Shorin Ryu Offline
Resident Forum Breakdancer

Registered: 02/07/05
Posts: 981
Quote:

Is the battle of Canae an example of a counter-attack?





It could be viewed as many things. I mean, this one battle has applications in Strategies 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, and 9.

I don't think any were intended to have clear lines of demarcation or separation (there's be a lot more aspects for each one if there was), rather that we look at these "options" and are able to properly apply them to battle tactics.

Its just like anything in life, if you follow the directions, things will work. If you follow the wrong directions, or don't follow the directions, things might get messed up. The 33 Strategies seem to follow the same principle in my eyes.

This can be viewed as a Counter-attack because Hannibal's best troops were purposefully on the flanks, and they were the main force of his army. Thus, the Romans attacked the weak force, while Hannibal "counter-attacked" with the rest of the army.

It can also be viewed as Strategy 8, Defensive Warfare. Obviously Hannibal chose a perfect defensive formation for the Romans to trap themselves in, and the rest is history...

Quote:


It's just, to me it seems more like an example of why an
attacker should never develop unsupported salients and should, instead, always seek to turn an enemy's flank or side so that they don't have to fight on two fronts...






Well, the strength of the Roman legions were in exactly what they did at this battle, standard formation marching forward. Hannibal knew this, and it's even reflected in the battle (Hannibal's middle collapsed...even quicker than he expected it to....)

The Romans weren't fond of too much flanking for the obvious reason that their formation was rather strict in a line. Hence, if they are attacking a side, there is less of a force to go up against (think teeter-totter, triangle wedge and a line, with a very small point of contact between the two). Basically, if a Roman legion tried to flank, it would have to divide, and that (as attested in several sources) usually just deadlines the strength of the legion.

The problem is the Legion worked on a type of "replacement" system. Two or three cohorts would be in the front lines, and then they would fall back and allow others, who are fresh and ready to fight, to move up and continue the battle.

A legion had 10 cohorts. In order to flank, you would need to 1/2 that and attack from each side. But if you only have 5 cohorts attacking, the replacement system becomes obsolete, as all cohorts would have to fight in order to maintain a long enough battle line.

Basically, a Roman army flanking with anything other than alea (cavalry) is pointless, because once they broke formation, the battle was over and the legion was decimated.
That's even reflected here. The Romans charged through the center, and broke formation to contine forward. The result was a lack of cohesion between cohorts, and the encirclement of the entire army.

I think it's very much a lesson reflecting Strategy 2 as well. Basically, the Romans were stagnant. They used the same tactic they had been using the past 50 years, and Hannibal had seen it several times before.

The Romans had the uncanny ability to "fight the last war", and the one before that, and the one before that....

It wasn't until the STOPPED doing the same thing over and over (Fabius Maximus "Cuncator") that the Romans finally gained ground.

And it wasn't until Hannibal's own stagnancy got the better of him that the war was won by the Romans. That's where Scipio played his role. He basically mimmicked Hannibal, and beat him at his own game.

Quote:


After all, Canae is an example of flank attack more than anything - I agree that the Romans attacked, but surely to claim that Hannibal's strategy was a 'counter-attack' rather than a novel method for taking pockets (ie. encirclement strategy) is a stretching the idea of counter-attack a little?





See above.
Could be a bit from column A, a bit from column B.

Quote:


Or would you consider a flank attack to be a counter-attack? I guess it depends on definition to a degree...





Well, Hannibal had to lure the Romans into attacking first before his flanking strategy could have any effect. I would consider a flanking strategy more a pre-emptive attack from one or more sides, where the enemy is not given the time to re-adjust their positioning to meet two fronts.

It wasn't so much that Hannibal flanked the enemy, the Romans had ways of dealing with that. It was the fact that the Romans needed act first in order for the flanking to work that makes me lean towards counter-attack.

Quote:


(and, by the way, nice graphics )




Google images is my friend....

EDIT:

Found an image that shows this replacement system.
Basically, the front lines move backwards when tired, the back lines move forward. Is so simpoe!



Edited by UofM Shorin Ryu (11/01/06 02:59 AM)
_________________________
Alea iacta est ~ Gauis Julius Caesar Ne quis nimis ~ Solon Nuts to cancer ~ Sanchin31

Top
Page 4 of 7 < 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 >


Moderator:  Cord, MattJ, Reiki 




Action Ads
1.5 Million Plus Page Views
Monthly
Only $89
Details

Ryukyu Art
Artifacts from the Ryukyu Kingdom missing since WWII. Visit www.ShisaLion.Org to view pictures

Best Stun Guns
Self Defense Products-stun guns, pepper spray, tasers and more

Surveillance 4U
Complete surveillance systems for covert operations or secure installation security

Asylum Images
Book presents photo tour of the Trans-Allegany Lunatic Asylum. A must if you're going to take a ghost tour!

 



Unbreakable Unbrella

krav maga